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MARKET AND REGULATORY APPROACHES TO
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE VIRGINIA
OBSTETRICAL NO-FAULT STATUTE
Richard A. Epstein*
I. THE WHO AND THE WHAT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
HE question of medical malpractice and its legal consequences
has long been of concern to lawyers and physicians. For years,
however, it seemed to be a problem that was well in control, given the
standard array of doctrines and practices that have grown up around
it. Today, medical care on average is probably better and more
sophisticated than it has ever been before. Yet since roughly 1975,1
the medical profession has regarded itself as under siege by a set of
legal developments, which both lawyers and judges have defended as
merely the regular and traditional application of the ordinary rules of
civil responsibility to physicians, who are, after all, no more special
than anyone else.
Everyone cannot be right, but everyone can be wrong. With
respect to medical malpractice, I think that this second possibility is
too close to the truth. There are essentially two general questions
that have to be decided in fashioning any system of medical malpractice responsibility. First, who should decide the applicable norms for
a given transaction? Second, what should those norms be? The traditional view of the subject has been that the first of these questions is
easy to answer, whereas the second is more difficult. On the initial
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* The James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
This Article was commissioned by the Institute of Medicine's Committee on the Effects of
Medical Professional Liability on the Delivery of Maternal and Child Health Care, in
Washington D.C. The paper was presented at the committee's research symposium on June
20, 1988 [hereinafter Research Symposium], and will appear in the forthcoming book, The
Effects of Medical Professional Liability on the Delivery of Maternal and Child Health Care
(J. Bulger & V. Rostow eds. 1989) [hereinafter Maternal Health]. I would like to thank
Victoria Rostow of the Institute for interesting me in this project, and James Fiero for his
valuable research assistance.
I This was the year of the first major physician revolt against malpractice insurance
premium increases in such major states as California, Illinois, and New York. See Kotulak,
Malpractice Suits-Growing Sickness, Chi. Tribune, May 11, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 1;
Malpractice: MD's Revolt, Newsweek, June 9, 1975, at 59.
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question of the allocation of power, the applicable standards should
be set up either by courts or by legislatures, where the latter can override the judgment of the former unless and until it infringes the constitutional rights of individual patients. With the locus of power thus
established, the debate then switches to the choice of collective standards applicable across the board. What are the rules for informed
consent, for setting the standard of care, for proving the breach of
duty, for measuring damages, or for taking collateral sources of compensation into account? The number of permutations within the
framework of a tort medical malpractice system is legion. The set of
possibilities is augmented yet again by more radical proposals that
jettison the "fault" standard and proceed on wholly different no-fault
principles. 2 Generally, obstetrics and gynecology are not regarded as
requiring special rules-and justifiably so. The Virginia BirthRelated Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Injured Infant Act),3
discussed in greater detail in Part III, applies only to a limited class of
obstetrical injuries and is therefore a clear, and ominous, exception to
the general approach.
The common mistake in the modem system of medical malpractice
responsibility lies in its facile answer to the first question. Why is it
assumed that some outside collective body-court or legislatureshould have the last word on the design of systems to deal with medical malpractice or, if you will, medical maloccurrences? The rival
system of private contracts between patients and physicians, who can
then decide these questions for themselves, is typically given very
short shrift.4 Yet once this possibility is taken more seriously, the
pressure for unanimous or substantial agreement on the substantive
issues is removed. If physician A and patient B structure their
arrangements one way, physician C and patient D are free to imitate
2 See Havighurst, Medical Adversity Insurance: Has Its Time Come?, 1975 Duke L.J. 1233;
Havighurst & Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance: A No-Fault Approach to Medical
Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 Ins. L.J. 69 (1974).

3 Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Supp. 1987).
4 I have defended this system more fully in Epstein, Contracting Out of the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, in 20 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 228 (1977); Epstein, Medical
Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure, in The Economics of Medical Malpractice 245 (S.
Rottenberg ed. 1978); Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 87. For other defenses of the same position, see P. Danzon, Medical
Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (1985); Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation
of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1986, at 173.
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them or to disregard that arrangement if they choose to do so. The
dominant question is no longer what single set of rules shall govern all
transactions, but is who shall decide which rules are applicable in any
individual case. The first function of legislatures is to make clear that
ordinary freedoms to contract may be exercised. The function of
courts is reduced to the modest one of enforcing contracts as drafted.
Thereafter, the legislature should simply stay its hand.
This last condition of legislative inaction explains why it will be so
difficult to implement contract solutions: markets always operate at
the mercy of legislative intervention. Moreover, there is today sustained and decisive political objection to any return to a marketplace
for medical goods and services. Putting aside, for a moment, these
practical political objections, I think that we can find reasons why a
system of contracts and markets works for most goods and services.
This general solution can then be extended to the specific problems of
obstetrical care. Part II analyzes the strengths and limitations of market mechanisms. Part III then discusses the coverage and the funding
rules of the Virginia Injured Infant Act.
II.

THE LOGIC OF MARKETS

A.

Why Contract?

The basic logic of contracting is simple and appealing. Everyone
generally starts with individual endowments in wealth, intelligence,
and skills. Physicians have their labor; hospitAls, their resources; and
patients, their wealth and natural talents. (For these purposes at least
we can put aside the question of how anyone comes by any particular
entitlement in the first instance.) Contracting parties also have a certain measure of self-interest, but that self-interest should not be too
narrowly defined; parents, for example, have a deep concern for the
welfare of their children, and will generally contract on their behalf.
All parties are allowed to exchange their endowments for others,
which they do not possess. The exchanges can take place on whatever
terms they see fit. Force and misrepresentation, as well as contracting
with infants and incompetents, however, are ruled out as improper
forms of advantage-taking.
At this point, the logic of self-interest takes over, to the public
good. Each side to the transaction will surrender those things that it
values only if it receives in exchange things to which it attaches a
greater value. Each voluntary exchange leaves both sides better off
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than they were before. Because there are no obvious negative externalities (who is hurt because A's children get better care?), the private
gains to the parties are also translated into social gains. An extensive
system of contracts, in which all contracts share this feature of mutual
gain, should-and would-lead us toward an improved social state of
affairs. Each individual exchange has led to an improvement of the
welfare of the parties to the exchange. As that process has been
repeated many times, the impact of the improvements is cumulative.
At the end of the process, each person should be better off than he
was at the outset, with nobody being left worse off. Because everyone
is better off in the final state of the world than in the original one,
there is a social optimum, which can even be measured by the exacting standards of Pareto optimality.
In practice, matters will not be perfect, of course, because contracts
are costly to negotiate, to draft, and to enforce.6 There comes a point
at which the transaction costs of making new bargains exceed the
gains that anyone could hope to derive from them. The system will
therefore reach equilibrium before all potential gains from trade are
exhausted. Transaction costs will prevent some worthwhile
exchanges from occurring. Nevertheless, this limitation on social welfare is a fact of life that can be overcome only by devising cheaper
modes of contracting (for example, group contracts), which allow
more bargains to go forward. It is hardly a reason for striking down
those contracts that have been able to emerge notwithstanding these
transactional obstacles.
B.

The Limitations on Contract

1. Imperfect Information
The critical issue is this: Is there any reason why this system of
bargaining is inappropriate for medical malpractice cases, both gener5 For a discussion of this exacting Pareto standard, and the alternative Kaldor-Hicks
standard, whereby there is a social improvement if the winners in principlecan compensate the
losers for their pains out of their winnings from the transaction, see Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 509 (1980). Note that the system of
contracting, with its unanimous consent, satisfies both criteria, and does not require some very
subtle social analysis to determine the relative impacts of complex regulatory programs on
both winners and losers.
6 For a formal introduction of transaction costs into modem legal and economic thinking,
see generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
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ally and in the special case of obstetrics and gynecology? Several reasons can be offered. It can be argued that individuals do not have
sufficient information to decide which bargains are in their best interests. There is surely reason for concern here, but the problem may be
overstated. Initially, the problem works in both directions. If individuals have imperfect information, then so do regulators, administrators, juries, and judges. To treat the question as though imperfect
information runs only in one direction is to misstate the universal
problems with imperfect information. Both forms of imperfect information-that of the consumer and that of the regulator-are critical.
Furthermore, where public regulation is involved, a single set of rules
must work for all those affected, notwithstanding any individual differences in taste and demand. The rules, moreover, will be prepared
by persons who have no real information about the subjective prefer,t
ences of the people whom they wish to protect.
Looking then to consumers, we can assume that they make decisions with imperfect information. That is not the same, however, as
their having no information at all. Moreover, in the case of consumers, the incentive structures are more favorable because the individuals who seek to get information are obtaining it for themselves, not for
the public at large. People can make inquiries, rely upon systems of
public certification, do business with institutions that have substantial
reputations, and hire intermediates to make certain decisions about
who shall provide what kind of health care. The rise of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), group insurance, employer and union
plans, and medical advertising represent increased efforts to close the
information gap at a reasonable cost.7 Surely, no one believes that the
problems of information are so great that patients should be denied
the right to choose their own physicians because patients do not have
medical degrees (or because they do!). And no one believes that the
right is valueless because the choice is at best random.
In general, imperfect information is a cost. Just as with other costs,
market institutions that are designed to reduce those costs will arise to
the extent that these institutions are cost-justified. Typically, individual patients will decide to trade off some measure of independence
and some resources in order to get some, but not all, information they
need. Even today, patients use the patchwork system to select hospi7 See

P. Danzon, supra note 4, at 211.
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tals and physicians, if only because it is better than any alternative
that can be devised. It is far from obvious, therefore, that a contract
system must founder badly in choosing the rules to govern malpractice. Why allow freedom in the selection of physicians, but not in the
choice of malpractice rules?
Medical mishaps are a common occurrence, and the issue has
surely been widely addressed in the press today. People therefore
contract with the expectation of gain, but with the knowledge of possible loss, especially in the medical setting. A set of rules for allocating the loss of that failure are not currently negotiated because there is
no freedom of contract in that domain. Let that freedom be guaranteed, and the subject will not be some idle afterthought to the basic
negotiations. Very serious attention will be given to the types of terms
that can and should be imposed with respect to the potential loss.
Any institution must have terms favorable enough to attract patients.
Yet they cannot be so one-sided as to bankrupt those patients at the
back end if, and when, something goes wrong. Whenever contracts
are used, both sides have to trade off gain against loss, benefit against
inconvenience. For large institutions, the fact that some level of medical malpractice will occur should be accepted as a social given.
There are too many cases for all to be handled correctly, no matter
what level of care is taken. The task of contracting is not only to
reduce these bad cases; it is also to see that the handling of bad cases
does not overwhelm the system as a whole.
Today, there is extensive competition for the provision of medical
services. That competition does not have to be confined to matters of
price, thereby holding the minimum level of acceptable services constant by government edict. There can also be competition over the
level of compensation provided in the event of a medical mishap.
Terms that regulate liability for medical mishaps do not have to be
kept apart from the general market processes by which agreements for
medical and hospital services are formed. Experimentation and innovation are possible here. The critic who thinks that an adoption of
contractual freedom automatically means that medical providers will
exclude all liability for all untoward consequences should ask himself
how he would respond when a rival provider offers some package of
benefits to persons injured during the course of medical treatment.
Surely, such a medical provider would not remain idle as market
share and profits shrink.
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In the abstract, it is very hard to know what the precise set of optimal terms is for all medical situations. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear
that the present set of legal rules is not optimal, given the decision of
many professionals to exit the market,8 the incentives for excessive
care that liability rules can create, and the enormous litigation costs of
the system at large. The fine-tuning that is needed to improve the
rules cannot be done by juries and courts who are years behind the
times, and who totally lack the hands-on experience necessary to
make the relevant tradeoffs. Contract solutions, on the other hand,
lead to decentralization, and to the quicker dissemination of successful practices and business arrangements throughout the medical
profession.
2. Binding the Child
There is one important qualification that applies to obstetrical (but
not gynecological) care: the physician/patient relationship is between
the physician and the woman. Yet the losses may be suffered by a
third party, the unborn child, who may be condemned by poor medical treatment to lead a life of diminished capacity and chronic pain.
The presence of this third party provides an obvious challenge to the
contract model, with its central tenet that two parties cannot bind a
stranger through their own agreement. It is plausible, therefore, that
no contract between a medical provider and a woman (with or without the child's father) could bind the infant, who surely has not given
any consent of his or her own.
A moment's reflection, however, should be sufficient to dispel any
illusion that the prohibition against binding strangers by contract
applies to the parent/child context. It is true that small children, not
to say unborn children, cannot contract on their behalf. Nor have
they consented to the tort rules or their no-fault substitutes. The way
to escape the difficulties of consent, however, is not with an elaborate
network of state decrees. Rather, the institution of guardianship
solves the consent problem, primarily by ensuring that the people
with the right incentives contract on behalf of the young. Parents, by
virtue of their status, have obligations not to abuse or neglect an
infant and, furthermore, incur affirmative obligations of support.
8 See Lewis-Idema, Medical Professional Liability and Access to Obstetrical Care: Is There
a Crisis?, in Maternal Health, supra note *.
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These obligations surely begin with the labor and nourishment that
parents should provide their offspring, but they are not so limited.
Parents may also contract with third parties for the benefit of their
children, just as they do when they buy their children food at the
supermarket, or provide for their education at a public or private
school.
The role of guardianship is deemphasized by those who are unsympathetic to contract solutions. Professor Atiyah writes accordingly,
"Babies and children are also consumers of health care, and it is a
serious question whether the law should allow the rights of children
to tort standards of medical care to be bargained away on their behalf
by adults." 9 The argument loses its emotive force when it is made
clear that not just any "adult" has the power to so bargain. The real
question is whether children are better off under the present tort
regime created by judges and legislators, than they would be under
the alternative contract regime, in which their parents would determine what is in their best interests. If parents are willing to accept the
same terms that are applicable to their children, then there is good
reason to think that the contract rules will be superior to the tort rules
said to protect the children. It is very hard to see how parents can
systematically exploit their children when they agree to the same
types of legal risks that their children must face. But even where the
contract terms are different (because the medical procedures are different), we should be very slow to condemn the variation as a parental
sellout of the child's interest. Calling the issue of parental control a
"serious question," as Atiyah does, only reaffirms that the issue is
important, a point on which everyone can agree. It does not indicate,
however, how the question should be resolved. The greater conflict of
interest is between the child and the state, not between the child and
the parent.
As a matter of sheer necessity, the guardianship arrangement dominates issues of medical care. There is little doubt, for example, that
parental consent is what energizes the selection of, and payment for,
medical services. It can also work for liability. If parents can make
all other fundamental decisions about the provision of medical care,
then why should one element of that set of choices-the terms of
9 Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1986, at 287, 295.
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compensation if matters go awry-be immune from parental choice?
Under the current medical malpractice system, parents are entitled to
choose any contingent-fee lawyer to bring suits on behalf of their
minor children. Why then should they be powerless to contract out
of that tort system for the benefit of their children? After the fact,
some parents may regret that choice, just as they regret other decisions made on other matters. But here, as elsewhere, liability rules
should be fashioned with an eye not only to compensation ex post, but
also to ensuring the access of medical services at affordable prices ex
ante. The only variation to the traditional scheme of contracting that
is required with regard to medical liabilities to newborns is the recognition of the guardianship relation. That is hardly an innovation of
modern legal theory.
To be sure, there are occasions when the state will override the
preferences of parents with regard to their children. These cases,
however, fall rather clearly within the traditional area of abuse or
neglect. How else should we view a decision to refuse surgical treatment to remove intestinal blockage of a Down's syndrome child, or
(of only somewhat more difficulty) to refuse to give to a child medical
treatment that is inconsistent with the religious beliefs of the parents?
But, again, the ordinary decisions on how to seek medical care are
today most emphatically within the province of the parents, whose
natural instincts provide the best shield that most children can ever
hope to obtain. Likewise, parents are in the best position to address
liability issues on behalf of their chilren.
3. Access for the Poor
It may be argued that these contract arguments work for the middle class but do not begin to address the question of access to medical
care for indigent families and their children. The concern is that indigent persons, because of their inferior economic status, bring less bargaining power to the contractual negotiations. Again, this point
misses the source of the current concern by failing to understand the
intimate relationship between access to medical care and tort liability
for malpractice. The use of the wrong liability terms has, and will
continue to have, a very powerful adverse effect on the level of care
made available to people who cannot afford to purchase it. This point
can be brought home most clearly if we consider the position of a
hospital that supplies charitable care to indigent patients free of

HeinOnline -- 74 Va. L. Rev. 1459 1988

1460

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 74:1451

charge. Historically, these hospitals have, as part of their admission

provisions, included conditions that exempted themselves from any
and all liability for physician or hospital negligence.10 These clauses
have typically been struck down as an improper form of contractual
exploitation of the extraordinary bargaining strength of the hospital.1 1

Nonetheless, judicial condemnation of these charitable exemption
clauses seems misconceived. With respect to indigents, a public insistence that a hospital is unable to release itself from medical malpractice liability necessarily reduces the level of access to care in order to
increase the level of malpractice protection. Thus, assume that the
hospital has a fixed and limited budget that it uses to alleviate the

plight of the needy. In a world without any malpractice liability, it
could treat, for example, 1000 patients, and engage in a level of care
that results in ten malpractice cases, for which no one receives any
compensation. When the ability to contract out of liability is barred,

some portion of the charitable budget must fund the potential mal10 For example, the Supreme Court of California examined the following admissions release
form in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963):
RELEASE: The hospital is a nonprofit, charitable institution. In consideration of the
hospital and allied services to be rendered and the rates charged therefor, the patient or
his legal representative agrees to and hereby releases The Regents of the University of
California, and the hospital from any and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts
or omissions of its employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its
employees.
Id. at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
1 Thus, the California court strnck down the clause in Tunkl, see supra note 10. In his
opinion for the court, Justice Tobriner reasoned:
Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or
all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity
for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming
within certain established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in
the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks
his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby
a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against
negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by
the seller or his agents.
Id. at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
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practice liabilities. Let us assume, therefore, that the number of cases
that can be handled decreases by 10%, to 900, while the incidence of
malpractice decreases by more than half, to 0.433%, so that there are
now only four such incidents.
Which world is the better world for the class of indigents in need of
medical care? If we only looked at those persons who in fact received
medical care in both instances, then the choice would seem to be
clear: the patient under the malpractice regime is better off on both
counts. He receives a higher standard of care, as well as some measure of compensation, if this standard of care is not met. Because the
patient wins both ways, the forced judicial invalidation of exculpation
clauses looks fully justified.
This analysis, however, is incomplete because it ignores the position
of those 100 patients who were unable to obtain care because of the
restriction in access caused by the new malpractice regime. If even
ten percent of these persons suffered adverse consequences because of
their inability to obtain any care, then the conclusion is reversed. The
loss of access means that there are now more in the original cohort of
actual and potential patients who sustain bad outcomes under the system with full tort protection than there are in the system that does not
provide any protection. (10 + 4 > 10.) These numbers are chosen
for illustrative purposes, such that one cannot have any confidence
that the rate of failure will necessarily be greater with liability rules
firmly in place. In principle, the errors could run in either direction.
It is quite possible that with a medical malpractice system, the level of
negligent treatment will not be cut by more than half; it may be cut by
less. It is also possible that many more than ten percent of people not
treated will develop some serious complications. Thus, just as this
scenario may be too grim, it may also be too optimistic.
It is doubtful, of course, that we shall ever obtain reliable data on
the relative strength of the two effects. Nonetheless, three observations can be made about the current state of affairs. First, the concern
with impaired access to medical care is a constant theme of health
professionals and administrators who work with indigent patients.
They report clinics closing or restricting access to service, and cite the
cost of medical malpractice insurance as one reason for the current
distress. It is doubtful that they are grossly wrong in their empirical
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estimations.12 Second, the leading legal decisions that deny the right
of hospitals to release themselves from medical malpractice do not
even address the interaction between the level of care required and the
resulting amount of care that hospitals can then provide. There is no
reason, therefore, to think that they have made the correct tradeoffs
when they did not identify these tradeoffs in the first place. 13 Third,
there is little reason to think that the hospitals have any perverse institutional incentives on the liability question. The profit motive is
surely not dominant in any area in which the institutional purpose is
to give away services at some positive cost to itself. Charitable hospitals hardly fall into the class of fast-buck operators, fly-by-night
sharpies, or gougers of the poor. It is hard to imagine that prominent
donors to medical research would oppose use of their funds for medical malpractice litigation and damage costs if those expenditures produced any aggregate improvement in the level of overall medical care
provided. There are a very large number of charitable hospitals, and
to the extent that they once adopted a uniform set of provisions, it is
probably based on the sensible observation that a liability regime does
more harm than good to its intended beneficiaries. There is good reason to believe that they may have been right.
The advent of increased public expenditures on medical care for the
poor has changed the situation. Services that were once provided for
free are now (at least in principle) paid for by direct government
funds. In this context, poor people do not have to bargain for themselves any more than middle-class people must bargain when represented by their employers. Public officials that supply the funds can
bargain on their behalf in order to obtain the best mix of medical
access and malpractice protection. It is possible that they would want
to purchase some malpractice protection for women and children,
unborn and born, who are covered by their plans. These agencies face
budget constraints that force them to make choices between how
12This was a constant theme in the discussion sessions at the Research Symposium, supra
note *. Few of the speakers who made this assertion had a strong intellectual orientation

toward markets.
13See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882

(1976). Note that insurance companies are often unwilling to provide additional coverage
against loss for an additional premium because of the risk of adverse selection-that is, those
persons who are likely to demand the coverage are the most likely to sue. The practice,
therefore, is to make the coverage constant across broad classes of cases. See R. Epstein,

Epstein, Gregory & Kalven's Cases and Materials on Torts 44 n.3 (Supp. 1987).
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much money they wish to spend on preserving access and how much
they wish to spend on assuring compensation when medical care turns
out to be inadequately provided. They are, of course, subject to the
same bureaucratic limitations inherent in all public agencies, but if
we are prepared to accept their role in other aspects of medical care,
then I am hard pressed to see why they could not be allowed to contract as agents for their beneficiaries on tort liability.
Yet how would they proceed? Welfare agencies also face heavy
budget constraints, and must make the same tradeoffs between access
to the system and the level of protection afforded to those lucky
enough to make it into the system. The official involved might make
the same decision desired by middle-class persons, and therefore stipulate for some particular malpractice compensation scheme. There
seems to be no reason why public agencies could not insist that all
malpractice disputes go to arbitration, as can now be done by private
employers. 4 Indeed, there is no reason to tie the fortunes of the poor
to the tastes of the middle class. The desire for greater legal protection against medical malpractice may well reflect middle-class
patients' greater willingness and ability to pay. There seems to be no
reason to assume that poor people have the same preferences, given
their far lower levels of income. Hence, poor people should not be
forced to enter into exactly the same kind of contracts. I would therefore allow the public officials virtually complete contractual freedom
in the kinds of medical services contracts that they negotiate for the
poor. The argument here is not that the "no liability solution" of
bygone days is necessarily best. It is that the persons in charge of the
programs have better information about the optimal set of contract
terms than that of legislatures or courts, and even (dare one say it)
than that of public policy analysts and law professors.

14 Carter Phillips, speaking on behalf of the American Medical Association (joined with 30
other medical groups), made this point very clear in his oral presentation at the Research
Symposium, supra note *, "Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving
Medical Liability Disputes," to be published in Maternal Health, supra note *. Phillips, like
me, is doubtful that any major restructuring of medical malpractice laws can be limited solely
to obstetrics and gynecology. See id.
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THE VIRGINIA NO-FAULT STATUTE

A.

The PoliticalSetting

My defense of contractual regimes for medical malpractice certainly does not represent today's dominant opinion. Quite the opposite, the first question-who should decide what the rules are-is
answered routinely in favor of plenary state authority. Political
action focuses on the second question-what rules the state should
impose. Given this particular framework, it is quite clear that the
legal solutions will no longer have the same type of generality, efficiency, and (if it matters) elegance of the contractual solution.
Instead, the pattern of behavior will be quite different because it will
now be necessary to contend with the dynamics of interest-group politics, as life-and-death questions ensure that both emotions and stakes
will be high.
The first rule of politics is that general solutions are often very hard
to achieve because there will be no sponsors to introduce them. Political action does not start with overarching philosophical theories. It
is galvanized by crisis, by dramatic incidents, and by the sense of dire
necessity. The Injured Infant Act, providing for no-fault insurance in
certain obstetrical cases, is illustrative of the general process. Over
the years, there has been a large number of attempts to formulate
comprehensive medical no-fault proposals, 15 and these have routinely
floundered on the inability of anyone to define the universal class of
compensable events-that is, those for which the new liabilities would
be imposed-with a level of precision that makes the system workable
in the broad run of cases.1 6 There have been, however, many wellpublicized judgments or settlements against individual obstetricians
for huge verdicts, beyond the levels of insurance they carry, and perhaps beyond their net worth.17
15 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
16 See, e.g., Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of

Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 845, 886-89 (1987); Keeton, Compensation for Medical
Accidents, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590, 605, 612-14 (1973).
17 For example, a 10 million dollar verdict against three prominent obstetricians in
Washington, D.C. prompted their patients and colleagues to rally around them on appeal. The

verdict exhausted the obstetricians' insurance coverage and, if it had been upheld on appeal,
may have forced them into bankruptcy. Colleagues Rally For 3 Doctors Ordered To Pay $10
Million, Wash. Post, June 4, 1988, at Al, col. 1. The case, however, was settled for $4
million-the limit of the obstetricians' coverage-as well as for $800,000 paid separately by the
hospital. Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1988, at Bl, col. 1.
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Initially, there is something very wrong with a system that says to a
physician: "Thank you for saving by timely and courageous intervention ninety-nine children from terrible fates and ruined lives. You
have earned your fee." Yet when the 100th child (even because of
negligence) suffers a similar terrible fate, we say, "Pay its full costs."
The scorecard that summarizes the results looks odd indeed. The net
social benefit equals ninety-nine lives spared a terrible fate; the physician's scorecard shows routine fees in ninety-nine cases, wiped out by
the huge losses on the last case. There is a manifest divergence
between the private loss that the physician bears and the net social
gain that the physician's activities produce. Actions that, on balance,
everyone would favor ex ante-for example, having the physician do
medical procedures that succeed ninety-nine percent of the time and
negligently fail one percent of the time-generate financially ruinous
results for the physician. The expenses in the one case dwarf the fees
in the ninety-nine others. The source of the gap is clear. The medical
malpractice system does not explicitly credit the physician for the
benefits provided in the ninety-nine cases of successful medical intervention. Yet individuals in making private decisions of whether to
accept or reject medical care will regard that benefit as more important than whether compensation will be forthcoming ex post for the
tiny fraction of cases that go wrong. 18
The question that emerges in the legal system is this: Once the medical malpractice system puts the wrong rules for compensation in
place in the obstetrical area, what can be done to undo the damage?
18 Clearly, this numerical example is dependent on the assumption that most medical
interventions are beneficial today. That assumption seems to be unquestionable even if the
exact ratio is subject to doubt. But even if the numbers were 98 to 2, the net positive would
still be very large, and the analytical point would remain the same. Benefits conferred are not
ignored in any ex ante calculation. In addition, if the percentage of negligence cases were
much higher, then the system would collapse under its weight. The frequency of malpractice
litigation would be unbearable if, for example, two percent of surgeries resulted in malpractice
litigation. If the average surgeon performed 100.surgeries per year, there would be two cases

per year. If each suit lasted five years, then the average surgeon would be a defendant in 10
cases at one time. Even the present frequency of litigation is far lower than this.
It has been suggested that the real torts crisis is that too few victims sue. See Abel, The Real

Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 443 (1987). Abel relies on the work of Patricia
Danzon, showing that 90% of the incidents of medical negligence do not result in any legal
action. See id. at 448 (citing P. Danzon, supra note 4, at 19-21, 23). Danzon's figures suggest
that nationwide there was in 1974 an annual total of 260,000 negligently inflicted injuries out
of over 1,500,000 iatrogenic injuries. See P. Danzon, supra note 4, at 20. If all these injuries
resulted in suits, as Abel urges, it would overwhelm the system.
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Private responses are surely possible, though not ideal. Fees can be
raised to cover the mishaps, but they are limited by the wealth of the
patients, a dominant concern for many indigent patients. Moreover,
patients' wealth limits the purchase of additional safety precautions.
If the situation gets bad enough, the movement will then be for legislation, which is what apparently prompted the passage of the Virginia
Injured Infant Act. 19 A close look at this novel statute reveals some
of the compromises that had to be made to secure its passage and
20
some of the serious defects in its basic structure.
B.

The Statutory Design

The Virginia Injured Infant Act is restricted to one class of major
injury:
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in
the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital which renders the
infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need
of assistance in all phases of daily living.2 1
The statute provides measures to collect and distribute the funds necessary to handle this important class of cases. First, the disposition of
claims is taken out of the tort system (with its jury trials) and placed
before the State Industrial Commission,2 2 whose usual responsibility
is to hear workers' compensation claims, which themselves often raise
substantial medical issues. Second, there is a network of substantive
provisions. Most notably, funds for the program are raised by a perhead flat fee of $5000 for individual obstetricians who choose to participate in the program.2 3 This fee is fixed by statute for the first
year" and cannot be raised in subsequent years, apparently even for
inflation.2" The fee for hospitals is $50 per delivery per year, subject
19 For a commentary on this Article that reveals the ideas and pressures underlying the
initial drafting of the Injured Infant Act, see O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on Market
Approaches: A Response to Professor Epstein, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1475 (1988).
20 For a fuller discussion of the content and passage of the statute, see Note, Innovative No-

Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1487 (1988).
21 Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987).
22 Id. § 38.2-5003.
23 Id. § 38.2-5019(A)(1).
24 Id.
25 Id. § 38.2-5020(A).
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to an overall cap of $150,000 per hospital.26 Physicians who do not
participate in this program are nonetheless required to contribute
$250 per year to the fund.27 If the funds raised from these three
sources are insufficient to cover the obligations under the program,
then the resultant shortfall will be covered by taxes levied on all insurance companies within the state, whether or not they are in the business of providing coverage for medical malpractice.28
As to the distribution of benefits from the plan, the patterns of compensation adopted parallel those used in workers' compensation
29
plans. The statute provides no compensation for pain and suffering;
it provides limited compensation for lost earnings, based upon fifty
percent of the average weekly wage, as well as for medical and other
support services over the life of the program, with setoffs, dollar for
dollar, for collateral sources under the plan.3°
Participation in this program is not mandatory for physicians or
hospitals. They are permitted to opt into the system at their free will.
If they agree to participate, however, the level of services that they
provide is subject to review by a Board of Directors, which administers the Injured Infant Act31 The physicians and hospitals must also
agree to participate in developing a program to provide obstetrical
care to indigent patients. 32 Curiously, neither physicians nor hospitals seem to be required to disclose to their patients their decision to
participate in the plan.
It is instructive to compare the political solution reached by the
Injured Infant Act to that which might be reached under market
arrangements. The analysis is conveniently divided into two parts:
coverage and funding. I take them up in that order.
Id. § 38.2-5019(A)(2).
Id. §§ 38.2-5019(A)(3) to -5020(A).
28 Id. § 38.2-5020(B). The collections are made "if required to maintain the Fund on an
actuarially sound basis." Id.
29 See id. § 38.2-5009.
30 Id.
31 Id. § 38.2-5001. As appointed by the Governor of Virginia, the Board shall consist of a
general citizen's representative and of representatives of the other interest groups under the
plan-participating hospitals, participating physicians, liability insurers, and nonparticipating
physicians-such that the majority of the Board represents its participants. Id. § 38.2-5016.
32 Id. § 38.2-5001. It is certainly worth noting that the obligation to so participate is not
26
27

made a separate substantive provision of the statute, but is incorporated into the definition of a

"participating" physician or hospital.

HeinOnline -- 74 Va. L. Rev. 1467 1988

1468

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 74:1451

C. Coverage
The coverage provisions here are restricted to only one class of serious injuries. Why is only this class included when other types of injuries might well be as serious? From the point of view of an outsider,
one possible answer is that problems arising in this class of cases were
so pressing that the legislature was forced to take it specifically in
hand, leaving the others to the malpractice system. Indeed, if there
are an estimated forty such cases per year,3 3 then the dollars involved
are in fact quite large. Each case under the program could easily generate present liabilities of several million dollars. Another explanation, with perhaps more descriptive power, is that the compromise
was necessary to get the bill through the Virginia legislature. Trial
lawyers form a powerful interest group in all states, and they could
well have blocked the more general removal of all obstetrical cases
from the medical malpractice system; after all, they do not want a
precedent that ends malpractice altogether.
A contract solution would doubtless be more general in its coverage. Ex ante, the dominant question is whether both sides are better
off by taking cases out of the tort system and providing some alternative system for compensation. Costs of prevention, needs for compensation ex post, and administrative costs of the system are likely to
control that inquiry. If that is the case, then there seems to be little
reason to differentiate by source within the class of severe injuries.
Although it may not be clear exactly how all severe injuries would be
covered, it is a good guess that they would all be covered in the same
way.
There is also a question whether this choice of compensable events
covered by the statute makes sense. Here, the definition on its face
appears quite narrow, being restricted to "injury to the brain or spinal
cord of an infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen or mechanical
34
injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation.1
The operative concern is not semantic because the meaning of the
terms is as clear as good legal draftsmanship could make it. Instead,
the issue is an empirical one: What is the percentage of all birth defect
33 See Memorandum from Kenneth V. Heland to the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists Committee on Professional Responsibility (Mar. 5, 1987) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
34 Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987).
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cases that will be contestable under the definition? In order to answer
this question, one must know a lot more about medicine than any
outsider to the profession knows. Nonetheless, it is possible to at
least note two sources of concern that might be raised about this warranty.3 5 First, it is often difficult to distinguish serious injuries caused
at or before birth from those caused by birth defects. The ultimate
physical condition that results in the two kinds of cases is often the
same in either case (for example, brain damage) although the medical
evidence is not reliable enough for anyone to make an accurate determination on causation. Second, it may be that certain serious fetal
injuries can be caused by intermittent drug (for example, cocaine) use,
which could not be distinguished from the compensable injuries under
the statute. Here, the problem turns out to be especially acute
because there now seems to be ample data suggesting that even a single "hit" of cocaine in the first trimester of pregnancy can cause massive neurological damage, even though it might be very difficult to
trace the results thereafter.3 6 Moreover, the incidence of maternal use
of illegal drugs, including cocaine, during early pregnancy is very
high, and has been estimated to be as much as eleven percent.3 7
Under a system of negligence liability, it is unlikely that even a tiny
fraction of these cases would create a colorable case for liability.
Under this statute, all of them do, especially if there is no trace of
cocaine or other drug left in the child's system six months later when
birth occurs. It seems most unlikely that the Virginia no-fault plan
was intended to be a compensation program for victims of maternal
drug abuse. Yet that is the risk it creates.
35 These issues were raised in a discussion by Donald N. Medearis, Jr., of the Department of
Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School and Chief of Children's Service at Massachusetts
General Hospital, and Ruth Watson Lubic, Ed.D., General Director of the Maternity Center
Association, in New York, at the Research Symposium, supra note .
36 According to one commentator:
In fact, the research suggests that a single cocaine "hit" during pregnancy can cause
lasting fetal damage. While a single dose of cocaine and its metabolites clear out of an
adult body within 48 hours, an unborn baby is exposed for four or five days....
Cocaine, which is soluble in fat, readily crosses the placenta, where the baby's body
converts a significant portion of it to norcocaine, a water-soluble substance that does not
leave the womb and that is even more potent than cocaine. Norcocaine is excreted into

the amniotic fluid, which the fetus swallows, re-exposing itself to the drug. As a result,
the researchers believe, almost no cocaine-exposed baby fully escapes its damaging
effects.

Brody, Cocaine: Litany of Fetal Risks Grows, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1988, at 19 (Chicago ed.).
37 Id. at 19, 23.
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The Virginia Injured Infant Act seeks to handle these problems by
using rebuttable presumptions: "A rebuttable presumption shall arise
that the injury alleged is a birth-related neurological injury where it
has been demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission, that the infant has sustained a brain or spinal cord injury caused
by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. '38 The initial presumption appears to be set in favor of the physician, until the Commission
makes the critical finding (which should not be made in drug cases)
that the brain or spinal cord injury is attributable to oxygen deprivation or spinal injury. Yet that question of fact can be highly controverted, and although presumptions can shift burdens, they do little to
reduce the total level of error. At most, presumptions only determine
whether the large residual errors that uncertainty creates are borne
mainly by plaintiffs or defendants. The drug cases could still arise
with sufficient frequency to inundate the whole system. If the gray
area under the statute turns out to be very large for medical reasons,
then clarity of draftsmanship will offer no refuge from an administrative nightmare, or from the strategic maneuvers of both sides.
In addition, other complications may arise. Thus, the claimant
who thinks negligence is clear will try to keep the case outside the
statute, whereas the defendant will try to bring it within the statute.
Yet nothing in the statute deals with this reversal of roles, which is
familiar to lawyers who work in workers' compensation cases. Ironically, a negligence standard, for all its flaws, may turn out to be more
desirable, if only because fewer cases straddle the negligence/no negligence line than straddle the iatrogenic injury/birth defect or drug
usage line. But under the statute, we have no market information
and, hence, no capacity for incremental adjustments in the basic rules.
There will have to be another obstetrical crisis before there can be
corrective action.
D. Funding
Equally striking are the provisions that address the funding of the
system as a whole. In market settings, any contract must work for the
joint benefit of the parties. There may be an uneven distribution of
the gains from trade, but each side will garner at least some portion of
those gains. Ex ante, there should be no losers. Legislation must not
38

Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5008(1) (Supp. 1987).
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satisfy that constraint, especially as the level of constitutional safeguards to economic liberties and property today is set at a very low
level indeed. 39 Hence, we should expect to see large amounts of
wealth redistribution take place within the system.
Initially, the fees charged do not begin to approximate the risks
that are covered. The Injured Infant Act does not reveal a budget
estimate as to the total likely expenses, which is then made the target
for the total charges imposed against the participants to the system.
Quite the opposite, the statute contemplates that any shortfall that
may develop shall be covered by all insurance carriers within the
state, regardless of the lines of business they write. Here, the physicians as a group are able to impose huge contingent (but very real)
liabilities upon insurance carriers who write only other unrelated lines
of business. The provision that insulates plan participants from any
historically justified rate increases makes it clear that the real question
is not whether, but when, the contingent liability will kick in. This
financing decision is not without its negative allocative consequences.
The imposition of taxes always distorts market decisions in the goods
or commodities that are taxed. When unrelated lines of insurance are
subject to taxes, they become less available to the consumers who benefit from them, as the tax drives from the marketplace all transactions
in which the difference between the buyer's gain and the seller's cost is
less than the tax in question.' Large taxes therefore tend to work
large misallocations. But insurance companies are an easy populist
target for attack, and their customers are too diffuse to protest. The
statutory financing scheme therefore exports misery. It does not eliminate it.

The usual somber conclusion of the public choice literature holds
here.4 ' The efforts in the political process to correct one distortion,
such as the medical malpractice tort rules, only create other distor39 For the modem statement, see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1975). I
have criticized this approach at length in R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power
of Eminent Domain 256-58 (1985), and more briefly in Epstein, Self-Interest and the
Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 153 (1986) and Epstein, Judicial Activism: Reckoning of Two
Types of Error, 4 Cato J. 711 (1984).
40 For a discussion of the so-called excess burden of taxation, see J. Gwartney & R. Stroup,
Economics: Private and Public Choice 110-11 (4th ed. 1987).
41For the classical elaboration, see J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
(1962). For the modem controversy, see Symposium on The Theory of Public Choice, 74 Va.
L. Rev. 167 (1988).
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tions in other markets. Even the sage cannot hazard a guess as to
which set of distortions is greater. But the ordinary analyst can say
with confidence that competitive markets in both sectors yield a better
social solution.
The redistribution provided by the statute works in more than one
direction. In order to extract profits from insurance companies, the
obstetrician groups had to make deals with other legislative interest
groups, and they did. With whom the deal was made, it is hard for an
outsider to say. But surely, welfare and children's rights groups and
some segments of the medical and insurance industries are likely candidates. The evidence appears on the face of the statute. The definition of a participating physician or hospital includes only those
willing to participate in developing programs to assist the poor: limited public service has become the quid pro quo for reduced tort liability. Here, I do not wish to quarrel with public assistance as such. But
why should it be funded from special taxes on obstetricians and hospitals? In a sense, the odd funding of this statute is a quid pro quo for
getting out of the tort system, in which they should have never
entered. The new principle is that bad common law rules are corrected only if the losers pay tribute to the legislature that relieves
them of their pains. (It is as if justice is done when the thief agrees to
sell back stolen property to its owner at a below market price.) The
Byzantine system of indirect payments that emerges results only in
public mischief because no one ever must make an explicit public
reckoning of what resources should go to welfare generally, or why.
The political system thus generates a set of hidden taxes and offbudget appropriations with which no citizen can keep pace.42 How
ironic it is that private contracts are attacked on the ground that consumers have imperfect information! The statute is drafted in a way to
keep its real costs hidden from public view.
Not only does the redistribution worked by the statute take place
between sectors, but it also occurs within the medical sector. Physicians are forced to contribute to the plan, whether or not they benefit
from participation. Yet, in ordinary private insurance markets, there
are powerful incentives to differentiate in cost of coverage for different

42 For a related discussion concerning AIDS, see Epstein, The AIDS Commission's Hidden
Tax, Wall St. J., June 13, 1988, at 12.

HeinOnline -- 74 Va. L. Rev. 1472 1988

1988]

Market Approaches

1473

insureds.43 The insurance company that can identify low risk providers of medical services and offer them premiums to match those services will eliminate any implicit subsidy of inefficient producers by
efficient producers. The legislated insistence upon a flat fee prevents
this particular program from having its desired effect. Now, physicians with routine practices are forced to subsidize their colleagues
who specialize in high-risk pregnancies. Moreover, the same implicit
redistribution can take place, for example, between small community
hospitals that do not derive any benefit from the hospital cap and
large university hospitals, with a far riskier patient mix, that do. In
principle, these subsidies are all inefficient, and at least with respect to
institutions, the plan should be modified to allow experience-rating if
data proves reliable enough to sustain it.
What about the consumer of medical services? In one sense, the
statutes in question do not mark a move to consumer consent. The
physician or hospital can opt into this system at its own will, but it
appears that the statute does not even require them to inform their
patients of the choice. At the very least, a provision that requires very
clear disclosure would be some improvement because medical providers would have to gauge the effect of their choices on their ability to
maintain their practices. Even if the patients should unanimously
approve the abandonment of the malpractice system, however, we
could not be confident that the system represents a social improvement, given the huge implicit subsidies (especially from insurers and
less so from nonparticipating physicians) built into the plan.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The total picture is at best cloudy because it is not clear whether in
the aggregate this no-fault situation is better or worse than the malpractice situation that it replaced. That malpractice system tended to
make every serious birth injury a tort suit, so that the skilled specialist
physicians and large hospitals suffered disproportionate losses. This
no-fault system hopes to correct that set of distortions, but only at the
expense of creating other distortions that may be as serious as the
43 For a general account of the operation of private insurance markets with respect to

liability, see Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985);
Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353
(1988).
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ones that are eliminated, if not more so. The point here is not that the
system is not perfect; no system is. Rather, it is that the system, especially with active legislative intervention, is more politically charged,
and more imperfect, than it need be.
Relative to Virginia's Injured Infant Act, markets have two great
strengths that are often underappreciated. First, they allow some
experimentation for ideal contractual terms, which could provide for
solutions better than those of either the medical malpractice system or
its limited no-fault alternative. Second, markets weed out all the
implicit subsidies that legislatures and interest groups are routinely
able to work into their deals. These advantages are not simply
abstract or theoretical. They increase the capacity of the society to
provide needed goods and services for all its citizens. In the clamor
for short-term reform, the overall social effects are often ignored in
favor of more insistent, and more parochial, considerations. Two
wrongs do not make a right. State-mandated no-fault statutes are not
the right response to the blunders of the present malpractice system.
Markets are.
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